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You climb a peak, you think you’re at the top – and then you notice there is a bigger peak right beyond it, and you’ve 
got to climb that one. That’s what popular struggle is like. And that’s lacking. Our quick-gratification culture is not 
conducive to that kind of commitment.1 
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I. Introduction 
Popular struggle, as Chomsky reminds us, is a long arduous journey with many ups and downs. Just as 
one success appears, another eludes us in the distance, dampening any sense of achievement. One of 
the longest and hardest popular struggles is the Palestinian people’s right to recognition and protection 
of fundamental human rights, including the right to an independent state. Palestine’s accession to the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the granting of observer status in the 
United Nations (UN) General Assembly are welcomed and long overdue developments towards 
eventual universal recognition.  
Yet Israeli repressive and violent practices continue and, in one form or another, are facilitated by 
corporations. Corporations concerned about shareholder profit maximization are becoming 
increasingly aware of stakeholder rights. Each and every one of us, as a consumer of goods and 
services, has the potential to bring pressure on corporations to change their behavior. Corporations 
are under pressure to prevent reputational damage and loss of profits through exposure of business 
dealings and consumer boycotts of goods and services. Closer public scrutiny also leads to ethical 
investment of public funds and may lead to legal action against corporations engaged in unethical 
practices. 
Chomsky’s lament about “weekend protestors” belies the daily news of protests around the world, 
suggesting commitment to protest exists but is now being used more strategically. Information 
technologies enable efficient cross-border communication between individuals and groups creating 
networks for mobilization of protest, which we can refer to as ‘protest networks’. The common theme 
of public participation in protest networks can be referred to generally as ‘the democratic imperative’. 
This paper argues that the democratic imperative is evident in three specific mechanisms aimed at 
changing corporate behavior: the Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement (BDS); 
the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (the Fund); and consumer class actions. It analyses 
the extent to which these mechanisms have achieved corporate compliance to prevent complicity in 
human rights violations, and considers whether they represent agents for change. 
II. Understanding the Nature of Corporate Complicity 
Problems exist under international law in relation to establishing liability of corporate entities for 
human rights violations and crimes against humanity in both determining whether they face criminal 
or tortious liability and whether lack of enforcement by an international judicial body. National laws 
vary with many jurisdictions recognizing only individual corporate official liability and a few 
recognizing corporate criminal liability of entities. 
Corporations providing goods or services (e.g. technological know-how, computing software, military 
and non-military equipment, telecommunications networks) may be implicated in subsequent harm 
caused from their use. By entering business dealings with governments using such goods or services 
to cause violations of fundamental human rights, corporations risk being held liable for complicity in 
international crimes, if the violations are serious to constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity. 
However, this is very much on the basis of individual criminal responsibility. Complicity occurs when 
a person knowingly helps another commit a crime. Under international criminal law, a person will be 
held criminally responsible for aiding and abetting where, for the purpose of facilitating the 
commission of a crime, he aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or attempted commission, 
including providing the means for its commission.2 Practical assistance, encouragement or moral 
support, which has a ‘substantial effect’ on perpetration of the crime is required.3 The form of 
facilitation need not cause or be a basis for commission of the crime (it does not need to be in the 
same location as the principal crime) and, crucially, can occur before, during or after the principal crime 
has been committed.4 What amounts to ‘substantial effect’ is determined by the facts of each case and 
contributing resources has been considered as ‘practical assistance’ with a substantial effect on the 
commission of crimes.5 Thus, corporations can be providing goods or services to a government in one 
country that uses these to commit crimes in another. 
Corporations can find themselves in many different scenarios where they are not the cause of the 
principal perpetrator’s crime, but the facilitator for its continuation. There are different ways of 
identifying such complicity or facilitation role. Generally, a corporation ‘facilitates’ when its conduct 
makes it easier to carry out adverse impacts, or changes the way adverse impacts are carried out 
(including methods used, the timing or their efficiency).6 The South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (STRC) concluded that businesses played a crucial role in sustaining the apartheid regime 
through three levels of involvement: “first-order involvement” companies actively designed and 
implemented apartheid policies (e.g. mining industry implementing migrant labor system);7 “second-
order involvement” companies knew the state would use their products or services for repressive 
purposes (e.g. banking provision of credit for repressive security operations and armaments industry 
supply of equipment used for human rights abuses);8 and “third-level involvement” companies 
engaged in ordinary business activities indirectly benefitting from the apartheid structure.9 
Dugard and Reynolds argue for a crime of apartheid approach to understand legal and political 
consequences of Israeli human rights violations and crimes against humanity against Palestinians.10 
This is a useful paradigm as it avoids the subjectivity in interpretation and application of international 
humanitarian law, and connects to a historical injustice in the form of the apartheid regime in South 
Africa that caused widespread condemnation among states and the global public. Apartheid is an 
internationally wrongful act that incurs state responsibility to cease and make reparations. It is also an 
international crime whose perpetrators can be prosecuted in national and international courts, with the 
wider ramification of galvanizing public outrage to bring about change in state policies and corporate 
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behavior. As Dugard and Reynolds note, “the significance of apartheid lies not just in the strength of 
its legal prohibition, but in the political purchase that it carries”.11 None of the soft law instruments 
regulating business, human rights, and investment specifically identify the crime of apartheid, which 
on the face of it appears problematic for risk identification and assessment of divestment decisions.12 
However, it is now established law and practice that apartheid constitutes a crime against humanity, is 
abhorrent to human conscience and contrary to fundamental human rights. Thus, it falls within the 
category of fundamental ethical norms used by the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global to 
assess whether certain companies should be part of its investment portfolio. 
Precedent for corporate complicity in international crimes dates back to the post-World World 2 
Nuremberg Tribunals with the prosecution and conviction of German businessmen assisting Nazi 
Germany.13 In 2004, a Dutch export broker involved in delivering thiodiglycol (a substance used for 
creating mustard gas) to Iraq was convicted of being an accomplice to war crimes.14 These cases show 
how corporations involved in manufacturing, financial services and telecommunications can provide 
governments with industrial and financial support in committing war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. But they are limited to establishing individual criminal responsibility of corporate officials 
rather than corporate criminal liability. The national criminal laws of certain states allow for 
prosecution of corporations as legal entities, but not all jurisdictions recognize the concept of corporate 
criminal liability. Post-Nuremberg international criminal tribunals have focused on individual criminal 
responsibility, although this may change with renewed commitment by the ICC Prosecutor to 
investigate business institutions responsible for contributing to international crimes.15 
Arguably, liability should not focus on individual corporate officials or even senior officials, who sign 
or negotiate contracts, but on the corporate entity for ‘organizational failure’. To make corporations 
act responsibly and remain accountable for their business dealings, international criminal law could 
develop corporate criminal liability based on ‘organizational failure’ (i.e. corporate culture and practices 
facilitating commission or participation in crimes)16 or strict vicarious liability (i.e. assumption of 
corporate liability for failings, whether committed by individual employees or not, leading to 
commission or participation in crimes).17 This would highlight the importance of international crimes 
and avoid opaque corporate practices scattering responsibility so widely and loosely that it becomes 
elusive or nonexistent.18 It would also avoid difficulties in applying the doctrine of identification used 
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in some jurisdictions to identify a person or persons of the company with the ‘directing mind and will’ 
to commit crimes.19 It may even incentivize a rebalancing of corporate due diligence to avoid 
potentially harmful business dealings instead of profit maximization and after-the-event damage 
limitation 
These international and national legal deficiencies cannot tackle the imbalance between multinational 
corporations exerting economic and political power over states, and the democratic imperative that 
elected representatives act in the wider public interest. Yet, in this legally uncertain terrain, the 
democratic imperative is being pushed to the forefront by a combination of non-legal and legal 
mechanisms aimed at corporate compliance. The more evidence that emerges on corporate complicity 
in human rights violations, the greater the call will be for accountability and action. The longer matters 
remain unresolved and unchanged, the more likely people will become disaffected and indifferent to 
formal decision-making processes and seek alternative ones. 
III. Protest Networks and the Democratic Imperative 
‘Protest networks’ are individuals and groups, enabled by cross-border communication, creating 
networks for mobilization of protest. Referred to as “an alternative network of relations”,20 “the 
networked revolution”21 and “transnational advocacy networks”,22 they represent alternative decision-
making processes which can place corporations under greater public scrutiny to bring about change in 
corporate behavior. Not dependent on elected representatives and operating parallel to formal 
decision-making processes, protest networks depend on voluntary public participation that we can 
refer to as ‘the democratic imperative’. The democratic imperative is about elected representatives 
acting on behalf of the public and in the public interest when dealing with corporations and, if this 
fails, alternative methods of public scrutiny and action against corporations. Consumer boycott 
campaigns, sovereign wealth fund investments and class actions against corporations all represent the 
democratic imperative in action with varying degrees of protest network involvement. Some have 
argued that human rights protest networks occupy a highly political space in transnational civil society 
and should be subject to the same principles of democratic governance as states (e.g. democratic 
participation).23 In theory, this seems logical and uncontroversial, except in that it seeks to assess the 
success of protest networks through the same prism as formal structures and processes – which is the 
antithesis of the reason for their creation in the first place. Part of the appeal of protest networks is its 
spontaneity and voluntary basis of public participation, which are undermined if state-centric norms 
and principles are transplanted as measures of success. What is needed is something more grounded 
in public conscience and morality to connect to values and taking action. In this sense, we can refer to 
‘the responsible consumer’ and ‘the responsible investor’. 
A. The Responsible Consumer and Tainted Goods and Services 
The responsible consumer is informed about the provenance of products and services and mindful 
not to use purchasing power to consume from corporations complicit in human rights violations and 
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crimes against humanity. In the context of boycott campaigns, purchase decisions are localized to 
individuals so that consumer spending is aligned with ethical choices not to cause or contribute to a 
particular social harm. Deliberate decisions are taken not to purchase or to avoid or substitute ‘tainted 
products or services’. It may also be a conscious act to disassociate from a particular company in order 
to punish it for its unethical practices, in what has been referred to as “expressive boycotts”.24 This has 
been seen in the anti-apartheid campaigns and boycotts of South Africa,25 and brand-specific boycotts, 
such as of Nestlé for its marketing of infant formula in developing countries.26  
In their study on consumer motivation to participate in social or ethical boycotts, Albrecht, Campbell, 
Heinrich and Lammel conclude that the more a “consumer’s involvement” (i.e. a psychological state 
of motivation evoked by a boycott topic based on a person’s inherent needs, values and interests) with 
an issue rises, the stronger their willingness to act in its support. Consumer involvement is the most 
important factor determining whether individuals will participate in boycotts.27 Those who had a 
positive attitude towards a particular boycott topic showed a much stronger willingness to participate 
in corresponding boycott campaigns than consumers who showed a lack of interest in the boycott 
topic. Alignment of boycott issues with personal values and interests shows the powerful connection 
between public conscience and morality and taking action as a responsible consumer. 
The Albrecht study also showed that a consumer’s brand commitment negatively influences their 
intention to participate in a boycott. The authors concede that boycotts are “a pervading and effective 
instrument to express consumer discontent with a company and its business practices”,28 advising 
company brand managers to counter boycotts by “invest[ing] in brand image campaigns that make 
consumers feel passionate about their brands. Boycotts, it would seem, are best countered with a strong 
offense”.29 The suggestion is that branding can be used to create personal values and interests aligned 
with the product or service, which will, in turn, lead to motivation to support rather than oppose the 
company. Yet, no matter how much marketing is deployed to engineer public perception and influence 
personal choice, such strategies fail to address the organic nature of protest networks that can trigger 
boycotts at unexpected times and circumstances. Brand commitment begins to erode when protest 
networks disseminate information about a company’s dealings or activities and engage and inform 
public debate. Also, the closer the individual is affected by unethical practices of the company, the 
more likely brand commitment will diminish and lead to becoming a responsible consumer.30 
The 1989 Hillsborough football disaster in the UK is a case in point. Ninety-six Liverpool FC football 
spectators were crushed to death due to football ground staff and police negligence. The Sun 
newspaper, in an article dated 19 April 1989 entitled “The Truth”, alleged that Liverpool football fans 
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had pickpocketed the dead, urinated on police, and caused the disaster.31 Bereaved families and 
survivors wrote letters of complaint to the newspaper challenging the veracity of its claims. The 
managing editor sent a general letter to bereaved families offering no apology for the article’s content 
or substantiation of allegations. He concluded that “if the price of a free press is a boycott of our 
newspaper, then it is a price we will have to pay”.32 Residents of Merseyside began boycotting the 
newspaper with campaign groups, such as the Hillsborough Justice Campaign, calling for a nationwide 
boycott.33 Sales of the newspaper in Merseyside fell by almost 40% at an estimated cost of £10 million 
per year.34 Despite apologies made in 2004 and 2012, bereaved families, campaigners, and Merseyside 
residents continue to boycott the paper.35 An independent public inquiry concluded that, apart from 
isolated examples of anger, frustration and inappropriate behavior, serious allegations against football 
fans were unsubstantiated and relied on hearsay.36 
B. The Responsible Investor 
Who or what is the responsible investor? In a general sense, it relates to ownership of purchase and 
investment decisions aimed at preventing social harms or not contributing to their aggravation. 
Purchase or investment decisions are made to actively support good practice in prevention of social 
harms, or not support bad practices that contribute to social harms. The 2006 UN Principles for 
Responsible Investment (UNPRI) define “responsible investment” as: “an approach to investment 
that explicitly acknowledges the relevance to the investor of environmental, social and governance 
factors, and of the long-term health and stability of the market as a whole”. Further, “[i]t recognizes 
that the generation of long-term sustainable returns is dependent on stable, well-functioning and well 
governed social, environmental and economic systems.”37 The emphasis is on long-term investment 
returns and societal benefits and studies have shown that companies taking this approach outperform 
others in terms of stock market and accounting performance.38 
Sovereign wealth funds (SWF) are not obvious vehicles of change for corporate behavior but 
increasingly significant in terms of their global financial position and the fact that public funds are 
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content/uploads/1.Whatisresponsibleinvestment.pdf.  
38 See, e.g., Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Impact of a Corporate Culture of Sustainability on 
Corporate Behavior and Performance, Harvard Business School, Working Paper 12-035 (Nov. 25, 2011), 
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involved.39 The International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG), originally composed 
of 25 countries, agreed to the 2008 Santiago Principles – non-legally binding self-regulatory rules 
governing SWF.40 In 2009, the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF) was 
established by the IWG to act as a voluntary group of SWFs “which will meet, exchange views on 
issues of common interest, and facilitate an understanding of the Santiago Principles and SWF 
activities”.41 It is composed of 28 member states, including Palestine. The Santiago Principles define 
SWF as: “special purpose investment funds or arrangements, owned by the general government. 
Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage or administer 
assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies which include investing 
in foreign financial assets”.42 This definition does not include investment for ethical purposes and has 
as its primary aim investment for “macroeconomic purposes”. Principle 19 requires that SWF 
investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns in a manner consistent 
with its investment policy, and based on economic and financial grounds.43 However, sub-principle 
19.1 recognizes that some SWFs have investment policies which take account of non-economic 
factors, such as implementation of legally binding international sanctions, social and ethical 
considerations.44 So long as they are publicly disclosed, these are legitimate investment decisions. 
IV. The Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement 
(BDS): Consumer Boycotts and Investor Divestment from Israeli 
Corporations 
BDS is one of the most successful non-legal mechanisms to emerge in terms of effect on corporate 
compliance. In July 2005 a coalition of Palestinian civil society groups called upon: 
…international civil society organizations and people of conscience all over the world to impose broad boycotts 
and implement divestment initiatives against Israel similar to those applied to South Africa in the apartheid 
era…to pressure your respective states to impose embargoes and sanctions against Israel…[which] should be 
maintained until Israel meets its obligation to recognize the Palestinian people’s inalienable right to self-
determination and fully complies with the precepts of international law by: 
1. Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall; 
2. Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and 
3. Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and 
properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194.45 
Consumers worldwide are informed about corporations operating in and around the occupied 
Palestinian territories (oPt) considered complicit in Israeli human rights violations and crimes against 
humanity against Palestinians. Campaigns, such as BDS, expose errant corporations and seek to engage 
ethical consumer purchasing power by boycotting the corporation’s products or services. Since 2005, 
there have been a number of successful boycotts: corporations pulling out of the oPt (e.g. Israeli 
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company SodaStream announcing closure of factory in illegal settlement);46 governments not renewing 
contracts with corporations (e.g. Portuguese and Argentinian governments not renewing contracts with 
Israeli energy and water companies);47 corporations not renewing contracts with government bodies 
(e.g. UK security firm G4S not its renewing contract with the Israeli Prison Service);48 investor funds 
divesting from companies (e.g. Dutch pension fund ABP divesting from two Israeli military 
companies);49 and corporate sponsors of public events under closer scrutiny (e.g. French multinational, 
Veolia, ending sponsorship of the UK Wildlife Photographer of the Year exhibition after exposure of 
its provision of infrastructure to illegal Israeli settlements).50 Modeled on the apartheid South Africa 
boycotts and sanctions, BDS operates as a modern-day example of how the democratic imperative can 
fill a legal void through consumer choice and direct action impacting on corporate profits and image 
to bring about change in corporate behavior. 
A. Boycott – What Does it Mean? 
The term ‘boycott’ was first used against Charles Cunningham Boycott, a nineteenth-century English 
land agent, who mistreated Irish tenant farmers. Initially refusing to work for reduced wages, the 
farmers were persuaded to return to work by Boycott’s wife only to be summarily evicted. They then 
persuaded Boycott’s servants, drivers and animal herders to leave him and his family, so that his social 
and economic marginalization was referred to as ‘boycott’.51 The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
boycotting as to “refuse to have social or commercial relations with (a person, country, etc.)”. Although 
not providing reasons for the boycott this is a sufficiently broad definition to encapsulate boycotting 
of corporations. 
A legal dictionary provides a rather less satisfactory definition as 
The system under which the life of a man is made unendurable and impossible by an organised refusal to have 
any dealings with him. Theoretically boycotting is the spontaneous outcome of the feelings of the individuals 
concerned in applying it to any particular person; but in practice it is often the effect of a fear that anyone refusing 
                                                          
46 SodaStream to close illegal settlement factory in response growing boycott campaign, BDS MOVEMENT (Oct. 30, 2014), 
http://www.bdsmovement.net/2014/sodastream-closes-illegal-settlement-factory-in-response-growing-boycott-
campaign-12782; Ian Black, SodaStream to move factory out of West Bank Israeli settlement, GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2014), 
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49 Dutch pension fund ABP divests from two Israeli arms companies, MEMO MIDDLE EAST MONITOR (July 4, 2014), 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/europe/12548-dutch-pension-fund-abp-divests-from-two-israeli-arms-
companies. 
50 Veolia to end sponsorship of major UK photography exhibition, BDS MOVEMENT (Dec. 11, 2012), 
http://www.bdsmovement.net/2012/veolia-london-museu-10147. Veolia was specifically identify by the UN Special 
Rapporteur as being complicit in Israeli breaches of international humanitarian law; see UN independent expert calls for boycott 
of businesses profiting from Israeli settlements, UN NEWS CENTRE (Oct. 25, 2012), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43376&Cr=palestin&Cr1#.VVDt1pOFc6N. 
51 Friedman, supra n24, 5-8. 
to take part in the boycott will himself be boycotted or suffer injury to his person or property. The system 
originated in County Mayo in the west of Ireland in 1880, the first victim being a land agent named Boycott.52  
Clearly not identifying the essentially neutral point about refusing to have dealings with a person, state 
or corporation, it judges those doing the refusing. The wrongdoer becomes the victim of suffering as 
opposed to actual victims he has wronged. This echoes modern-day criticisms of neo-liberals ‘victim-
blaming’ to avoid responsibility for their actions; perhaps even shame for being identified as a 
wrongdoer. A more neutral legal definition is: “a deliberate refusal to have any dealings with another 
person (or state), named after Captain Boycott in Ireland”.53 
B. Boycott – What is its Impact? 
The above definitions go some way in explaining boycotts but, as Friedman points out, fail to capture 
the nature of consumer boycotts – that they are essentially acts of economic disengagement rather than 
acts of social isolation and these two rarely act at the same time. Friedman’s specific definition of 
consumer boycotts is: “an attempt by one or more parties to achieve certain objectives by urging 
individual consumers to refrain from making selected purchases in the marketplace.”54 This focuses 
on individual consumers’ use of the marketplace to secure market-based (e.g. lower prices) and non-
market-based (e.g. stopping corporate complicity in human rights violations) goals. Others, such as 
Tyran and Engleman, distinguish “demand withholding” (i.e. an individual’s refusal to buy) from a 
“boycott” (i.e. a collective refusal to buy).55 In their experimental study on actual consumer behavior 
in economic consumer boycott (i.e. collective refusal to buy in response to unfair marketing practices), 
they conclude: the ability to organize and enforce boycotts affects their success in the marketplace; 
consumers use boycotts for expressive reasons (i.e. to punish the seller for unfair price practices); and 
that boycotts cause persistent losses in profits and market efficiency.56 
V. The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global: Ethical and 
Responsible Investment 
Established in 1990, the Fund is the world’s largest SWF valued at NOK 6,616 billion (approximately 
USD 849 billion) in 2014.57 It holds approximately 1.3% of the world’s listed equities.58 Its main 
objective is to ensure growth of North Sea oil revenues in order to protect future generations of 
Norwegians’ public sector pensions. As one of the original signatories to the UNPRI, the Fund 
exemplifies a responsible investor by implementing Santiago sub-principle 19.1 to include social and 
ethical considerations in its investment strategy. Human rights, international humanitarian law, 
weapons and the environment are key social and ethical considerations for the Fund. An independent 
body, the Council on Ethics, applies the 2004 Ethical Guidelines to make recommendations to the 
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Norwegian Ministry of Finance on which companies to exclude from investment and which companies 
to place under observation during investment. The Guidelines set two main objectives: 1) to use the 
Fund as an instrument for ensuring that a reasonable portion of the country’s petroleum wealth 
benefits future generations, with financial wealth managed so as to generate a sound return in the long 
term, which is contingent on sustainable development in the economic, environmental and social 
sense; and 2) not to make investments which constitute an unacceptable risk that the Fund may 
contribute to unethical acts or omissions, such as violations of fundamental humanitarian principles, 
serious violations of human rights, gross corruption or severe environmental damages.59 Whereas 
treaty supervisory bodies, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and ICC make quasi-legal and legal 
determinations respectively on violations of international human rights law and humanitarian law, the 
Council is not concerned with and has no authority to make such determinations against states. It can 
only make ethical, not civil or criminal liability, determinations against companies based on an 
assessment of their conduct.60 The Council assesses whether an act or omission is attributable to the 
company and contributes to violations of human rights, humanitarian principles, or other ethical 
norms.61 
A. Assessing Complicity 
The Fund is a means to fulfill government pension fund investment objectives rather than a blunt 
instrument used to change other state conduct or Norwegian foreign policy. However, because the 
investment objectives are related to ethical norms and international human rights and humanitarian 
law, the Council is inevitably involved in making determinations on whether companies breach such 
norms and laws, thus operating as a foreign policy exposure-pressure mechanism.62 In the Council’s 
practice, “complicity” in human rights violations or breaches of ethical norms has been interpreted as 
“contribution”. First, the Council must protect against the Fund contributing to unethical actions 
through owning shares in companies that are responsible for unethical acts or omissions. Second, it 
must assess whether there is an “unacceptable risk” of the company contributing to “present or future” 
unethical acts or omissions, thereby implicating the Fund. This means it is not necessary to prove that 
a “contribution” will take place; the presence of an “unacceptable risk” is sufficient for a 
recommendation to exclude the company.  
The Council has set criteria for establishing complicity: (i) existence of some kind of linkage between 
the company’s operations and the existing breaches of the Guidelines, which must be visible to the 
Fund; (ii) breaches must have been carried out with a view to serving the company’s interests or to 
facilitate conditions for the company; (iii) the company must either have contributed actively to the 
breaches, or had knowledge of the breaches, but without seeking to prevent them; and (iv) breaches 
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must either be ongoing, or there must exist an unacceptable risk that norm breaches will occur in the 
future. Earlier norm breaches might indicate future patterns of conduct.63 Past acts or omissions are 
not in themselves a basis for exclusion of companies, but they may indicate future conduct and so will 
be relevant in the assessment of future risk of complicity in violations.64 
From the Fund’s perspective, the Council’s prospective assessment operates as a preventative 
mechanism against complicity, although its impact on company conduct is less certain. In the Total 
recommendation, there were concerns about Total’s complicity in human rights violations in Burma 
between 1995 and 1998 through the construction of a gas pipeline. By the time the Council made its 
assessment, the pipeline had already been completed. The Council recommended not excluding Total 
because “in future construction projects Total is hardly likely to put itself in a situation in which it is 
associated with the use of forced labor. Any financial gain accruing to Total thanks to forced labor is 
assumed to be far outweighed by the negative light in which the accusations have placed the 
company.”65 From the victims’ perspective, this assumes the company will reach a similar assessment 
of risks, preventing it from being complicit in future violations. It also fails to establish corporate 
responsibility for past violations. But the Council’s remit is prospective assessment of unethical 
conduct based on the company’s sphere of control, thus the process acts as a shield rather than a 
sword.66 In contrast, in the Wal-Mart recommendation, due to ongoing serious and systematic 
violations of labor rights in the company’s supply chain, and the company not responding to requests 
for information or providing that it would prevent future violations, the Council concluded there was 
“an unacceptable risk that the Fund…may be complicit in serious or systematic violations of human 
rights” and recommended exclusion.67 
B. Categories of Exclusion 
The Fund will not invest in companies which (either through themselves or through entities they 
control) produce weapons that: violate fundamental humanitarian principles through their normal use; 
produce tobacco; or sell weapons or military materiel to states that are subject to fund investment 
restrictions on government bonds.68 Exclusions and observations fall under the following specific 
categories where there is an “unacceptable risk that the company contributes to or is responsible for”: 
a) serious or systematic human rights violations, such as murder, torture, deprivation of liberty, forced 
labor and the worst forms of child labor; b) serious violations of the rights of individuals in situations 
of war or conflict; c) severe environmental damage; d) gross corruption; and e) other particularly 
serious violations of fundamental ethical norms.69 To date 64 companies are excluded70 and 1 remains 
under observation.71 Three Israeli companies (Africa Israel Investments, Danya Cebus, Shikun & Binui 
Ltd) are excluded under category b), and one (Elbit Systems Ltd) under category e). 
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1. Serious Violations of the Rights of Individuals in Situations of War or Conflict: 
Exclusion of Israeli Companies 
In November 2013, the Council recommended exclusion of Africa Israel Investments (AII) and Danya 
Cebus (DC) due to their contribution to serious violations of individual rights in war or conflict 
through the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem.72 The Norwegian Ministry of Finance 
decided to follow the Council’s recommendation. These companies were previously excluded from 
August 2010 to August 2013 on the basis of similar activities and, after receiving assurances that there 
were no plans to construct settlements in the West Bank, the Council recommended removal from 
exclusion in August 2013. But information revealed DC, a subsidiary of AII which owns 82% of it, 
was the general contractor for the “C-Jerusalem” settlement project in East Jerusalem, and was 
confirmed by AII. 
The Council determined that the settlements were illegal under international law. Article 49 of the 1949 
Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians, to which Israel is a party, prohibits an occupying 
power from deporting or transferring its civilian population into the occupied territory. Reference was 
also made to the UN Secretary General’s 2011 statement that “settlement activity in the West Bank, 
including East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law”.73 The 2004 ICJ Advisory Opinion,74 UN 
Security Council Resolution 465 (1980) and a 2001 ICRC statement all establish that the settlements 
breach the Geneva Convention.  
Using the International Commission of Jurists’ definition of complicity through facilitation, building 
settlements does make it easier to carry out adverse impacts or changes in the oPt because it represents 
an encroachment on Palestinian lands and an illegitimate assertion of sovereignty. But the STRC’s 
“first-order involvement” category seems more appropriate here because AII and DC were actively 
involved in the design and implementation of the Israeli state’s settlement policy, similar to South 
African mining companies implementing the migrant labor system for the apartheid regime. In fact, in 
correspondence with the Council, AII stated that it regarded East Jerusalem as part of Israel and that 
its construction activity there could not be equated with construction of settlements in the rest of the 
West Bank.75 However, Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem is illegal under international law, as 
established by the UN Security Council Resolution 478 (1980). Thus, by DC constructing settlements 
and AII holding a controlling interest in DC, both companies were excluded due to “an unacceptable 
risk of the companies contributing to serious violations of the rights of individuals in situations of war 
or conflict”.76 
Shikun & Binui Ltd was also involved in the building of Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem and the 
remainder of the West Bank. The Fund owned shares in the company worth NOK 13.8 million. 
                                                          
72 Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global, Council on Ethics, Recommendation to exclude the companies Africa 
Israel Investments Ltd. and Danya Cebus Ltd. from the investment universe of the Government Pension Fund Global 
(Nov. 1, 2013), 
https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/310d42b99ce242ad9f2cb5a2f7ec70db/africa_israel_eng_nov_2013.pdf; 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance, New decisions about the Government Pension Fund Global (Jan. 30, 2014), 
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/new-decisions-about-the-government-pensi/id750091/.   
73 UN Secretary General, Secretary-General Disappointed by Israel’s Decision on New Settlement Construction in West Bank, Reiterates 
Settlement Activity Contravenes International Law, Statement (Aug. 6, 2011), 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/5ba47a5c6cef541b802563e000493b8c/c4bb7721a06a99dc852578e6004a5728?Op
enDocument. 
74 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 
136, ¶ 120 (July 9) [hereinafter ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion]. 
75 Recommendation 1 November 2013, supra n72, section 4. 
76 Id., section 6. 
Despite the company not responding to the Council’s request for information, the Council relied on 
publicly available information relating to company activities, and the 2004 ICJ advisory opinion and 
numerous UN Security Council resolutions establishing the illegality of Israeli settlements in the 
Occupied Territories. It considered that Shikun & Binui Ltd. contributed to violations of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention by building an Israeli settlement in East Jerusalem and recommended exclusion 
on the basis that “there is an unacceptable risk that the company will participate in future violations of 
ethical norms by undertaking the construction of Israeli settlements there…[and]…this risk will remain 
as long as such activities are permitted or until the company makes it clear that such activity has 
ceased”.77 
2. Other Particularly Serious Violations of Fundamental Ethical Norms: Exclusion of 
Israeli Companies 
This category of exclusion is a general one relating to “fundamental ethical norms”. These are not 
defined but the original committee which drafted the Ethical Guidelines refers to international 
standards on human rights, labor standards and the environment.78 These are reflected in the 1977 
ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises, 2000 UN Global 
Compact Ten Principles, 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the 2011 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 
In 2009, when the Israeli government was building the wall in the West Bank, the Council 
recommended exclusion of Elbit Systems Ltd because it supplied a surveillance system as part of the 
wall. At the time, the Fund’s equity investments in Elbit Systems Ltd had a market value equivalent to 
NOK 35.8 million. Following on from the ICJ’s 2004 advisory opinion on the illegality of the wall,79 
the Council noted that: 
…construction of parts of the barrier may be considered to constitute violations of international law, and Elbit, 
through its supply contract, is thus helping to sustain these violations. The Council on Ethics considers the 
Fund’s investment in Elbit to constitute an unacceptable risk of complicity in serious violations of fundamental 
ethical norms.80  
What was important for the Council to consider was the extent of the company’s contribution to 
ongoing Israeli breaches of international law. 
The Council faced the dilemma of dealing with a company commissioned by its own state to commit 
illegal acts. In addition, there was the question of whether all companies supplying products or services 
to Israeli authorities on the construction of the wall would be considered complicit. On the latter point, 
the Council decided not all types of contribution to the construction of the wall provide grounds for 
excluding companies from the Fund.81 For this reason, the Council preferred to make its assessment 
on a case-by-case basis considering the “significance of a company’s role in the violations” without 
explaining what could amount to a “significant role”. In an earlier case relating to Caterpillar Inc. 
supplying the Israeli army with bulldozers and spare parts, the Council determined these were dual use 
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products (i.e. used for legitimate or illegitimate purposes)82 not within the Guidelines. Unless it could 
be shown that there was a “strong element of complicity” by Caterpillar in any possible violations, it 
could not be held accountable for any illegal uses of the products it supplied and, therefore, could not 
be excluded from the Fund.83 Again, there is no definition of what constitutes “strong element of 
complicity” and the Council’s reasoning could be criticized for stretching the actual purpose of dual 
use products. If the supplier company is made aware or should be aware that dual purpose products 
are actually being used for illegitimate purposes, then surely this requires, at a minimum, undertaking 
substantial risk assessment of the viability for future supplies? The 2011 OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises require corporations to prevent or mitigate an adverse impact which is 
directly linked to their products or services by a business relationship.84 Specifically in relation to 
human rights, corporations are required to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are 
directly linked to their business operations, products or services by a business relationship, even if they 
do not contribute to those impacts.85 Corporations are required to undertake general risk-based due 
diligence to identify, prevent and mitigate actual and potential adverse impacts,86 and a specific human 
rights due diligence where there are risks of adverse human rights impacts.87 
Elbit Systems Ltd produces electronic systems primarily for the defence industry. The surveillance 
system developed and delivered by Elbit did not in itself appear to be unethical, but its contribution 
to the wall needed to be considered to determine whether it constituted a serious violation of ethical 
norms. The Council identified a number of significant factors: the surveillance system was one of the 
main components of the wall and its associated control regime; Elbit was the end supplier of this 
system; the system was especially designed for the wall and had no alternative areas of application; and 
Elbit was aware of where and how the system was intended to be used.88 These factors meant the 
surveillance system was a “functionally integral part” of the wall being built by the Israeli government, 
which is considered a violation of international law,89 and Elbit’s contract makes it an “important 
contributor to this activity”. Thus, continuing to invest in Elbit would expose the Fund to an 
“unacceptable risk of complicity in particularly serious violations of ethical norms”. 
3. Ongoing Review of Israeli Companies 
In 2008, the Council assessed whether to continue investing in Israel Electric Corporation (IEC), a 
company 99.9% owned by the Israeli state, due its role in the reduction of electricity supply to Gaza. 
The Fund held bonds issued by IEC. Several Palestinian and Norwegian NGOs requested exclusion 
of IEC on the basis that reduction of electricity supply constituted collective punishment of 
Palestinians.90 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) confirmed that 
IEC was instructed by the Israeli Ministry of Defense to reduce electricity in response to firing of 
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rockets from Gaza into Israel.91 The UN OCHA concluded that such power cuts contributed to the 
humanitarian crisis in Gaza “impacting water and sanitation infrastructure, disrupting healthcare 
delivery and adding misery to the lives of civilians, as Gazans will continue to bear the brunt of the 
reduction of power”.92 In Jaber Al-Bassiouni Ahmed et al. v Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, the Israeli 
Supreme Court rejected a petition by Israeli and Palestinian human rights groups claiming reduction 
of supply would violate international humanitarian law because it would cause certain, serious and 
irreversible damage to the essential humanitarian needs of the Gaza Strip, its hospitals, the water and 
sewage system, and the entire civilian population.93 The Court concluded there was no violation 
because Israel fulfilled its obligation to supply electricity for essential humanitarian needs of the civilian 
population, and supplies could be controlled within Gaza to prevent any adverse impact on essential 
humanitarian needs (a matter disputed by the petitioners).94 
The Council makes its own assessments of risks relating to breaches of ethical norms and it does not 
have to follow court decisions from countries where companies operate. It specifically stated that the 
Israeli Supreme Court ruling had no direct bearing on its own assessment of whether electricity supplies 
could be controlled within Gaza to support essential humanitarian needs. It concluded that whilst the 
matter was highly technical requiring extensive insight into the construction and operations of the 
electrical distribution system in Gaza, “in practice, it is probably difficult to distribute the power 
according to humanitarian needs”.95 Regarding whether to exclude IEC from its investment portfolio, 
the Council decided that the power cuts were not ongoing so it did not recommend exclusion. 
However, the Council reserved its right to review “if future reductions in the electricity supply to Gaza, 
causing unacceptable humanitarian conditions for the civilian population, are introduced by IEC, the 
Council may renew its assessment of the Fund’s investment in IEC”.96 
VI. Litigation: Class Action against Breaches of Corporate Social 
Responsibility Agendas 
By publicly representing business values and ethical practices in the form of corporate social 
responsibility, corporations leave themselves open to scrutiny and challenge regarding practical 
implementation. Judicial cases and media coverage of corporate misconduct reveal corporate impunity, 
alerting the public to expect more and inquire further. Often there are no legal mechanisms to pursue 
human rights claims per se against corporations so that claims relate to specific corporate practices that 
may indirectly relate to complicity in human rights violations.  
Consumer class actions are a legal mechanism with potential to indirectly hold corporations 
accountable for complicity in human rights violations. Groups of individuals, consumer bodies, 
NGOs, or even the state can bring contractual or tortious claims in the wider public interest (e.g. using 
corporate social responsibility codes to claim non-fulfillment of a legitimate expectation that business 
practices prevent, avoid or mitigate adverse human rights impacts). Some common and civil law 
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jurisdictions recognize general class actions and others restrict them to certain areas of law.97 Others 
restrict actions to certain areas of law or provide indirect routes to a class action.98 
Examples of indirect litigation of corporate complicity through class actions include: corporate 
misrepresentation for non-compliance with corporate social responsibility codes;99 invoking company 
law provisions on stakeholder rights to information about corporate impact on climate change;100 
consumer right to information on fuel economy and CO2 emissions of new cars;101 corporate 
fraudulent misrepresentation for private gain;102 corporate conspiracy to misdirect scientific 
information on an important issue for private gain;103 and breach of advertising standards.104 
OECD National Contact Point complaints may also be made under the OECD Guidelines for 
disclosure against corporations not providing accurate non-financial information in relation to their 
business activities.105 In Amnesty International and Friends of the Earth v. Royal Dutch Shell106 it was alleged 
that Shell was making incorrect, misleading and unsubstantiated statements about sabotage being the 
cause of oil spills. These had a negative effect on the communities in the Niger Delta because spills 
classified as the result of sabotage meant no liability or responsibility for Shell to compensate victims. 
It also was alleged that Shell was using such statements to deflect attention from legitimate criticism 
of its own environmental and human rights impact in the Niger Delta, misleading key stakeholders 
including consumers of Shell’s products and investors in the company.107 The Dutch National Contact 
Point decided that Shell’s statements were based on flawed investigations and disputed evidence, and 
that its general communication with stakeholders was flawed.108 The National Contact Point did not 
conclude these constituted breaches of the Guidelines but recommended Shell take account of 
evidence that may dispute earlier published data and related communications, and be prudent in general 
communications to stakeholders about oil spill figures when discrepancies exist with regard to their 
causes or amounts.109 
The most generous standalone provision for class actions in a domestic jurisdiction is Federal Rule 23 
in the United States (US), which allows representative parties, whose claims are similar to a numerous 
class of persons, to sue on behalf of the class where there are questions of law or fact common to the 
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class, and where the representative parties will protect the interests of that class.110 A number of mass 
tort claims have been brought against corporations for complicity in human rights violations. In Doe 
v. Unocal, the plaintiffs, a group of Burmese residents, alleged Unocal complicity in human rights abuses 
(e.g. forced labor, rape, murder and torture) by the Burmese military during the construction of a gas 
pipeline. After the District Court had granted Unocal’s motion for a summary judgment partially in 
their favor, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment to find sufficient evidence of complicity to 
justify consideration of the merits. The trial was set for April 2005 but the parties settled out of court 
in 2004.111 In the Total recommendation, the Norwegian Council on Ethics relied on this case to accept 
“as a fact” that “Total is presumed to have had the same knowledge of, and responsibility for, the 
human rights violations in connection with the pipeline construction as Unocal”.112 The original case 
was against Total and Unocal, but claims against Total were dismissed due to lack of personal 
jurisdiction. This illustrates the complementarity and limitations of ethical and legal mechanisms. 
Although litigation offers a potential route to address past violations and compensate victims, plaintiffs 
will need to satisfy procedural requirements and establish a link to a parent company and overcome 
legal recognition of corporate personality and limited liability. No such requirements are necessary 
under the Council’s ethical assessment process and there is a lower threshold to establish corporate 
complicity. However, the process does not address past conduct of the company and cannot 
compensate victims. 
Recent case law in the US has raised concerns about the extent to which tort claims can be brought 
against corporations for complicity in human rights violations. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the 
Supreme Court decided that under the Alien Tort Statute, traditionally used by foreign national victims, 
there is a presumption against extraterritoriality so that it could not be used against an oil corporation 
allegedly complicit in human rights violations committed by the Nigerian state.113 This somewhat 
departs from previous case law under the Statute involving foreign nationals alleging corporations, 
with some connection to the US, were complicit in human rights violations in other states. Reading 
the Kiobel decision carefully it appears that the door has not completely shut on extraterritoriality. The 
Supreme Court set a specific requirement for rebuttal of the presumption against extraterritoriality: 
claims should “touch and concern the territory of the United States” with “sufficient force”.114 How a 
claim “touches” and “concerns” the US and what exactly amounts to “sufficient force” was not 
explained, although it was stated that “mere corporate presence” will not be enough. So this area will 
have to develop on a case-by-case basis. Other possible consequences of Kiobel could be to encourage 
other jurisdictions to recognize extraterritoriality for application of domestic laws to corporate 
complicity; specifically in the US, for claims to be brought under state tort laws, and naming individual 
corporate officials as defendants in claims brought under the Torture Victim Protection Act.115 
VII. Conclusion 
Those who have money can shout the loudest, but those who do not can occupy spaces where they 
can be heard, fighting on their own terms not seeking to occupy the power-holder’s position. This 
seems to be a pretty good maxim as to the potential for protest networks to have an impact on changing 
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corporate behavior. Public participation in protest networks is a form of the democratic imperative; 
vocalizing public interest issues where formal state decision-making structures may prove inadequate. 
The democratic imperative is also about elected representatives acting in and on behalf of the public 
interest when dealing with corporations and, if this fails, alternative methods of public scrutiny and 
action against corporations taking place. Consumer boycott campaigns, sovereign wealth fund 
investments, and class actions against corporations represent the democratic imperative in action with 
varying degrees of protest network involvement. 
In a relatively short period of time, the BDS campaign has not only attracted global public attention 
but also political action in setting up protests and boycotts of Israeli companies deemed complicit in 
human rights violations and crimes against humanity. These have led to companies pulling out of the 
oPt, governments not renewing contracts with Israeli companies, investor divestment, and closer 
scrutiny of corporate sponsorship activities. A key part of BDS’ success is its ability to organize 
effectively and tap into public concerns. Consumer behavior research shows that the more a 
consumer’s ‘involvement’ (i.e. psychological state of motivation evoked by a boycott topic based on 
personal inherent needs, values and interests) with an issue rises, the stronger their willingness to act 
in its support. This is the most important factor determining whether individuals participate in 
boycotts. 
The Fund proactively exercises shareholder ownership rights to ensure investment growth for the 
benefit of Norwegian citizens, as well as protection against corporate complicity in human rights 
violations and breaches of ethical norms. This demonstrates implementation of the democratic 
imperative. The Council on Ethics’ assessments of whether companies pose a present or future 
unacceptable risk of exposing the Fund to complicity in violations and breaches can lead to company 
exclusions from the investment portfolio. Among the current exclusions are Israeli companies 
involved in building illegal settlements in East Jerusalem and the remainder of the West Bank 
(constituting serious violations of the rights of individuals in war or conflict), and providing a 
surveillance system for the wall (constituting serious violations of fundamental ethical norms). From 
the victims’ perspective, the Council’s remit of prospective assessment of unethical conduct fails to 
establish corporate responsibility for past violations. But as a non-judicial body the Council applies the 
Ethics Guidelines rather than civil or criminal law to establish corporate complicity, lowering the 
threshold for establishing ethical responsibility. 
The possibility of bringing class actions against corporations represents a form of the democratic 
imperative, although procedural requirements and costs may hinder success. A criticism of private 
consumer action, as opposed to class action by victims, is that it privatizes harm. Claimants are not 
acting on behalf of actual victims of harmful corporate conduct and seek redress for indirect harms 
suffered. Private profiteering could emerge with consumer litigants awarded damages. However, this 
could be avoided through consumer/stakeholder class actions whereby consumer bodies, NGOs or 
the state bring claims against corporations on issues of wide public importance. These types of actions 
are justifiable as they transcend individual concern to focus on wider public interest issues. 
All three mechanisms demonstrate possibilities for scrutinizing corporate behavior, holding 
corporations to account, and perhaps even leading to change in corporate behavior. Realistically, a 
combination of responsible consumer and responsible investor actions will be necessary to bring about 
positive change in corporate behavior. 
 
